From: Arnaud <*****************> To: IGIS_Enquiries Subject: Re: False equivalence from Cherly Gwyn's report [unclassified] Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 08:34:32 +1300 Dear IGIS_Enquiries, Thank you for your prompt reply to my email of October 28. I note that you have not contested the fact that a fallacy exists in the Gwyn report relating to the jurisdiction of the enquiry. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I would like to point out that my interest in this matter is legitimate due to the public liability arising from the tort of defamation of Phil Goff. In your you reply, you say that "the office of Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security was created in 1996 by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act". The office, being a right to exercise a public trust, was not created by the legislation you identified because that right is contingent upon acting in the public interest, which is not something that is inherent to any act of legislation. The position that the legislature always acts in the public interest is refuted by the fact that legislation can be misinterpreted to give the impression that a right exists to injure public liberty. You then describe limitations of scope prescribed by the legislation and requirements imposed by the legislation. I should point out that the requirement of non disclosure is only applicable to persons bound by the legislation. The question of whether or not Phil Goff is such a person is of the same nature as the issue of jurisdiction that I raised in my initial email, i.e. it is based on the point that "persons" and "people" are not equivalent terms. An expansive interpretation of "person" is in conflict with the common law according to the following maxims: Potestas strict interpretatur. Power should be strictly interpreted. Ambiguitas contra stipulatorem est. An ambiguity is most strongly construed against the party using it. A restrictive interpretation is obtained from an early legal defintion: person: A man considered according to the rank he holds in society, with all the rights to which the place he holds entitles him, and the duties which it imposes. 1 Bouv. Inst. no. 137. A human being considered as capable of having rights and or being charged with duties, while a "thing" is the object over which rights may be exercised. (Black's dictionary of law, 2nd edition.) The position that Phil Goff, as a minister, has rank because he holds a high station in society is only valid here if any rights exist within society pertaining to his position. Interpreting "minister" to mean "servant" implies that Goff has the right to a wage, but since he is a minister of the Crown and not a public servant his rights and duties apply to the Crown and not to society in general. If a man has no rank within society then he does not meet the criteria of the definition from Black's dictionary. The fallacy that I identified is of course not limited the matter of the jurisdiction of the recent inquiry, but exists in a manner similar to an article of religion of the state. The head of state of New Zealand holds the title of "Supreme Governor of the Church of England", so the proposition that the state position on sovereignty is based more on faith than on the facts isn't an unreasonable one. Public liability exists as the tort of defamation of Phil Goff by public servants, the defamation being the allegation that he acting wrongfully by releasing information from the investigation which tended to exonerate him from previous allegations. It was lawful for Goff to release that information because it diminished the public liability arising from the defamation relating to the nature of his briefing on alleged Israeli espionage. Public liability also exists relating to the breach of trust by public servants regarding the expansive interpretation of the legislation. This liability does not originate with the Gwyn report, but is a constitutional problem which should be remedied by public disclosure. Arnaud Wylie.